AsiaFile

Miraculously, they lost not a single soldier or military cargo plane during their short-lived Iraqi deployment. Yet Tokyo has also found itself victimized by the misguided war policies of the Bush administration.

So as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s travels for the first time to Washington this week to affirm his nation’s strong ties to the Bush administration, he should reflect on the problems his wealthy but isolated nation can get into when it relies too much on the insistent demands of a stubborn “best friend.”

Before Sept. 11, 2001, Japan’s single most important foreign policy goal was to acquire the seat on the United Nation’s Security Council it manifestly deserves, as one of that organization’s largest financial supporters. Through humanitarian work and foreign work, Japan had assiduously sought to boost its international standing, and cleanse an image damaged by its colonization of Asia during the 1930s..

That noble aspiration was effectively dashed, however, when Washington, demanding that its best friends put “boots on the ground” asked then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to send 550 Japan Self Defense Force soldiers to the southern Iraqi city of Samawah. By acquiescing to the insistent plea of its single most important ally to support an invasion the U.N. itself refused to sanction, Tokyo permanently undermined its chances of acquiring that Security Council chair it had sought for years.

The two-year Iraqi deployment, which ended last year, effectively destroyed the fiction that Japan’s large military would never again become involved in war. Koizumi termed the Iraqi deployment a “humanitarian mission,” in order to sidestep Japan’s own pacifist Constitution, written,  ironically enough, by the American occupiers of Japan in 1946 which renounces for all time the nation’s ability to wage war. Sending troops onto foreign soil now gives Abe, Koizumi’s designated successor, the political space to take the larger and more controversial step of rewriting the Constitution and scrapping its pacifist language in order to transform Japan into a more aggressive and “forward leaning” military power.

Creating a more militaristic Japan is hardly likely to win Japan deeper friendships in Beijing or Seoul, where continuing controversy over the issue of the recruitment and support of “comfort women” during the Japanese occupation of East Asia to service the sexual needs of Tokyo’s soldiers continues to rub at old wounds.  Abe wants to see his citizens become more “patriotic,” even though Japanese school texts still don’t teach its children the truth about the massacre of civilians in Nanjing or the brutal colonization of Korea at the turn of the 20^th century. With China already investing heavily in its military footprint, does the world we really want to see another arms race develop across Asia?

Perhaps more importantly, the Japanese decision to support the Bush administration’s Iraqi incursion – a move opposed by the vast majority of Japanese citizens, according to opinion polls – did not come as the result of some hard-headed consideration by Tokyo’s policy makers after developing a nuanced and comprehensive Mideast strategy. Instead, the knee-jerk decision to support George Bush was reduced to a simple calculus: If we Japanese don’t support the Bush administration’s foreign policy goals in Iraq, who will support us should North Korea launch another ballistic missile in Japan’s direction?

Unfortunately for Japan’s new Prime Minister, the Bush administration believes that as the world’s only superpower, it need only take from its friend without giving much back much in return.  Desperate for at least one foreign policy success, the Bush White House has finally signaled some flexibility in its North Korea policy, agreeing to meet directly with representatives of Pyongyang. That in turn led to a breakthrough in six party talks last month (of which Japan is a member) that may mean the North Koreans once again allow access to international atomic inspectors to ensure the Yongbyong nuclear reactors will not process more bomb-making materials.

But Prime Minister Abe rose to political prominence at home through his demands that North Korea release complete details of the Japanese citizens it coldly kidnapped during the 1970s, and Washington wants some deal with Pyongyang to move forward, whether or not Abe is satisfied. The White House will press Abe to moderate his demands for a full accounting so that a deal with Pyongyang can be struck.

So rather than feeling empowered by his broad partnership and deep friendship with the Bush White House, you can’t blame Abe if he might actually be feeling more marginalized around the globe. Seoul and Beijing remain distrustful of his militaristic talk. Because he is unwilling to push for dramatic liberalization of Japan’s limping economy, his rapidly aging nation looks old and tired compared to the dynamic growth occurring across China, host of the 2008 Olympics and Asia’s rising power.

Instead of attempting to create mutually beneficial ties with the rest of Asia, and forging a more independent foreign policy that stresses its own self-interest, Abe’s Japan now finds itself ever more tightly bound to an administration in Washington losing support abroad almost as rapidly as it is deflating at home. Isolated and alone, Abe has only Mr. Bush to turn to. Next time, the Japanese might hope to find themselves some better friends.